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JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN POSTCONFLICT IRAQ:
ESTABLISHING THE RULE OF LAW IN AN ISLAMIC
CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY
DAVID PIMENTEL*

BRIAN ANDERSON*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Contemporary Iraq is facing the full range of challenges that

come with postconflict transitional justice. This includes the backward-looking issues of restorative and retributive justice for the
atrocities and mass human rights violations they suffered during

the Saddam Hussein regime and the conflict that followed his
downfall.' It also includes the forward-looking efforts of "paving
the road to peace and reconciliation" and establishing a functional
state characterized by the rule of law in a society torn apart by
conflict.2

Among the critical institutions demanding attention in the postconflict reconstruction is the judiciary-particularly with respect to
its independence.3 There is increasing recognition that a functional legal system, one that protects rights and redresses wrongs, is
vital to restoring peace and stability to a war-torn society.4 Only
* Visiting Associate Professor of Law, Ohio Northern University; admitted to the
bars of Washington (1988), California (1991), Hawaii (1991), and the District of Columbia
(1998). J.D. 1988, Boalt Hall School of Law, University of California, Berkeley; M.A. 1987,
University of California, Berkeley; B.A. 1984, Brigham Young University. Special thanks to
Fatih Oztirk for the invitation to submit this paper, to Haider Ala Hamoudi and Asifa
Quraishi-Landes for help and inspiration, and to Kevin Donahoe and Sarah Shilvock for
research assistance. Opinions expressed herein are exclusively those of the authors.
** Assistant Professor and Reference Librarian, Ohio Northern University; admitted
to the bar of Ohio (2010). LL.M. 2011, Ohio Northern University; J.D. 2010, Ohio Northern University; B.A. 2006, University of Wisconsin at Milwaukee.
1. See generally PosT-CONFLIUcr JUSTICE xv (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 2002) (defining
postconflict justice).
2. Id.
3. See Angeline Lewis, judicial Reconstruction and the Rule of Law: Reassessing Military
Intervention in Iraq and Beyond, in 39 INTERNATIONAL HuMANiTAlUAN LAw SERIES 22 (Brill

2012).
4. See generally U.N. Secretary-General, The Rule of Law and TransitionalJusticein Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies: Rep. of the Secretary-General, U.N. Sec. Council, U.N. Doc. S/

2011/634 (Oct. 12, 2011) (explaining rule of law and transitional justice findings and how
to further promote the rule of law in conflict and postconflict societies to work toward
international peace).
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with such a sound legal system-and a fair, impartial, and independent judiciary-will people trust their disputes to the state and
refrain from the vigilante score-settling that signals the breakdown
of the rule of law.
There is nothing routine about postconflict justice. Every postconflict society, including Iraq, faces a unique set of circumstances.
The problem of creating an independent judiciary in Iraq is exacerbated by a number of factors. Among these are the explicit recognition of the law of Islam in the Iraqi Constitution,5 the inability
to pass legislation on the Federal Courts of Iraq leaving several provisions of the Iraqi Constitution unimplemented, 6 and the deBa'athification authority in Iraq, which has the power to effectively
remove judges from office based on allegations that they were too
closely tied to the prior regime.7 The absence of a law on federal
courts leaves several other critical elements of judicial independence unaddressed, including provisions for the tenure, reappointment, and removal ofjudges.8 Serious concerns about security for
judges in Iraq only further complicate the prospects for judicial
independence in the near future. Any hope for a functional state,
competent to establish and maintain the rule of law in Iraq,
depends on the success of efforts to address each of these challenges. It is a tall order.
II.

POSTCONFLICT RULE OF LAW IN

A.

IRAQ: CoRE ELEMENTS

FunctionalLegal Institutions, Including Courts

When nineteenth century constitutional theorist A.V. Dicey contemplated the "rule of law," he was careful to articulate that punishment for crime could come only for violating pre-existing laws
and after sentencing by regularcourts, and that rights are protected
5.

Article 2, Section 1(A), Doustour Joumhouriat al-Iraq [The Constitution of the

Republic of Iraq] of 2005, translated in Iraq: Constitutions and FundamentalLaws, HEINON

(expand
LINE, http://heinonline.org/HOL/COWShow?collection=cow&cow-id=204
"Iraqi Constitution, 2005" heading; then expand "Original Text" heading; then follow
"Council of Representatives [consulted 2012]" hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 15, 2013) [hereinafter Iraq: Constitutions and Fundamental Laws].
6. See id. art. 92.

7. See Supreme National Commission of Accountability and Justice Law of 2008
(Iraq), translated in Statutes, GLOBAL Jusr. PRAc.: IMQo, http://gjpi.org/library/primary/

statutes (follow "Supreme National Commission of Accountability and Justice Law No. 10
of 2008 (English)" hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 16, 2013).
8. See Seventh United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Milan, It., Aug. 26-Sept. 6, 1985, Basic Principleson the Independenceof the
Judiciary,60-61, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.121/22/Rev.1, Annex [hereinafter BasicPinciples].
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by ordinary legal processes.9 It follows that a functional court system-one that will dispense justice according to these pre-existing
laws, and following ordinary legal processes-is essential to the
rule of law. Corrupt court systems cannot deliver justice, and inefficient court systems cannot deliver timely justice; and each therefore is incapable of upholding or enforcing the rule of law.' 0
Moreover, a judiciary that is not independent is by definition
dysfunctional, as it is incapable of carrying out its core function in
a constitutional democracy." Absent independence, a court cannot be impartial, and history is replete with examples of judicial
systems shamelessly manipulated by political actors who exploit the
lack of independence to make courts tools of political control. 2
B.

Public Confidence in Legal Institutions, Including Courts

The independence of the judiciary is a good thing only if the
courts are worthy of the public's trust; otherwise, it will undermine
the rule of law rather than enforce it.13 A judge should be independent, insulated from outside pressure, precisely so she can feel
free to do the right thing without fearing adverse personal consequences, no matter how unpopular the decision may be. At the
same time, independence similarly helps a corrupt judge feel free
to do the wrong thing without fearing adverse personal consequences. Therefore, judicial independence is a virtue only if the
courts are already fair, impartial, and functional.
It is not enough that the public institutions, particularly the
courts, be worthy of the public trust. In order for courts to support
and safeguard the rule of law, "the public must actually trust
them."' 4 Without public trust, courts and other legal institutions
9. JANE STROMSETH ET AL., CAN MIGHT MAKE RIGHTS?: BUILDING THE RULE OF LAW
AFrER MILITARY INTERVENTIONs 70 (2006).
10. Under the popular maxim, "justice delayed is justice denied," there is no such
thing as untimely justice. If it is untimely, it is not justice.
11. Cf David Pimentel, Reframing the Independence v. Accountability Debate: Definingjudicial Structure in Light ofJudges' Courage and Integrity, 57 CLEv. ST. L. REv. 1, 5 (2009) (noting
that judicial independence is a requirement for the rule of law and that judges must be
free to act independently in applying the law to ensure uniform protection of a democracy's citizens).
12. See, e.g., Alena Ledeneva, Behind the Facade. 'Telephone Justice' in Putin's Russia, in
DICTATORSHIP OR REFORM?: THE RULE OF LAw IN RussIA 24, 25-26 (Mary McAuley et al.
eds., 2006) (discussing the origins of corruption and the lack of transparency in the Russian legal system and emphasizing how the power of Russian politicians' oral commands
interferes with judicial fairness).
13. See Pimentel, supra note 11, at 15.
14. David Pimentel, Culture and the Rule of Law: Cautions for Constitution-making, 36
FoRDHAM INT'L L. J. ONLINE (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 11) (on file with author).
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will be under-utilized and actively disregarded, as aggrieved persons will resort to self-help rather than the legal process to resolve
their disputes.15 Until the public institutions earn the public's confidence, they will be "plagued with dysfunction": the public will
avoid such institutions, will choose to ignore their decisions, and
will work to undermine their authority.1 6
Alabama Chief Justice Sue Bell Cobb's statement reaffirms that
the courts' only claim to power and relevance lies in the trust and
confidence of the public: "'All the court system has is the public's
respect,' . . . 'If we lose the respect, we don't have anything.' "17
The challenge in a postconflict setting, therefore, is not just to
build a functional court system worthy of public confidence, but
also to foster the necessary confidence itself. This is not a shortterm enterprise; it will likely take at least one generation, and likely
more, to overcome resistance to distrusted institutions.18
C.

Lustration/Vetting

Lustration has been widely employed as part of the postconflict
justice strategy in the Central European countries that were once
members of the Soviet Bloc. It is a process designed to identify and
expose collaborators with the prior regime, usually so they can be
barred from positions of power or influence in the postconflict
state.' 9 The lustration (also known as "vetting") procedure
adopted in the Czech Republic in 1991 has served as a model for
many other states. 20
Effective lustration can be critical to effective postconflict justice
because it is essential to restoring public confidence in government
institutions. 2 ' If the same personalities who oppressed the public
before and during the conflict continue to wield power and
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. John Schwartz, Uncertainty in Law Circles over New Rules forjudges, N.Y. TIMES, June
10, 2009, at A20 (quoting Justice Cobb).
18. Pimentel, supra note 14 (manuscript at 11).
19. Roman Boed, An Evaluation of the Legality andEfficacy ofLustration as a Tool of Transitionaljustice, in PosT-CONFucr JUSTICE 345, 345 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 2002); see also
Mark S. Ellis, Purging the Past: The Current State of Lustration Laws in the Former Communist
Block, 59(4) LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 181, 181 (1996) (explaining the purpose of
lustration).
20. See Boed, supra note 19, at 346, 352 n.33.
21. See Eric Brahm, Lustration, BEYOND INTRAcTrABIUTY (June 2004), http://www.be
yondintractability.org/bi-essay/lustration; see Boed, supra note 19, passim (describing how
lustration has been effectively used as a tool in achieving postconflict justice); Ellis, supra
note 19, passim (same).
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authority in the new regime, the public will continue to fear the
system.22 They will have little reason to trust their disputes to the
system, or to turn to formal legal institutions for protection of their
interests and vindication of their rights.2 3
At the same time, lustration itself can be problematic for human
rights, as it may easily assume the characteristics of a witch-hunt,
where collective guilt is applied without assessment of individual
responsibility.2 4 Due process concerns, both substantive and procedural, arise quickly in this setting as well, where the lustration
process may brand individuals with guilt by association. 25 "Those
subject to banning are not necessarily implicated in past human
rights violations; they may only have associated with a particular
group (e.g., political party, ethnic or religious group, military) that
committed widespread human rights abuses."26
While lustration has gained wide acceptance and legitimacy as an
important tool in postconflict justice, it must be implemented with
great care and sensitivity to avoid undermining basic human rights
norms and protections.27 Without this care, lustration can run the
risk of interfering with the independence of the judiciary by
allowing politically-motivated lustration proceedings to threaten
and coerce judges. 28
D.

Other Key PrinciplesofJudicial Independence

The postconflict situation in Iraq raises some other concerns for
judicial independence-issues that the government needs to
address to ensure that the rule of law prevails in Baghdad and
throughout Iraq. The Basic Principleson the Independence of theJudici-

ary (U.N. Basic Principles), adopted by the United Nations in 1985,
22.

See Brahm, supra note 21.

23.

See id.

24.

Boed, supra note 19, at 346 (citing MORTON H. SILAR & KRASSIMIR KANEv, Am.

Ass'N FOR ADVANCEMENT

SCI.,

DECOMMUNIZATION: A NEW THREAT TO SCIENTIFIC AND

AcA-

DEMIC FREEDOM IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE vi-vii (1995)).

25.
26.

Boed, supra note 19, at 346.
TRICIA D. OLSEN, LEIGH A. PAYNE & ANDREw

G.

REITER, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN

BALANCE: COMPARING PROCESSES, WEIGHING EFFcAcY 38 (2010).

27. See Boed, supra note 19, at 378. Boed criticizes the Czech approach, but concludes
as follows:
A lustration scheme could be conceived which would satisfy the applicable
requirements of human rights law. Such a scheme would need to avoid impermissible discrimination by proposing a legally-tenable objective, such as, for
example, the development and preservation of a democratic order, and by closely
tailoring its differentiation criteria to this objective.

Id.
28.

See infta Part III.C.1.
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includes a fairly comprehensive list of issues to address.29 For the
Iraqi judiciary, it is worth calling attention to a few issues in particular, including (1) improper influence and unwarranted interference,30
(2) deficiencies in terms of "established legal
procedures," 3 ' (3) training and qualification of judges,3 2 particularly to rule on the applicability of principles of Islam,3 3 and (4)
the terms, conditions, and tenure of judges being adequately
secured by law. 34 This Article addresses each separately in Section
III.C below.
III.

RULE OF

LAw

CONCERNS AS THEY APPLY TO

AND THE

A.

IRAQI

IRAQ

CONSTITUTION

Article 2 and Protectionof Minority Populations

A key principle of the rule of law is the protection of minority
populations in a given society, including religious minorities.35
Indeed, this issue arises under the latter two of the three "kindred
conceptions" A.V. Dicey identified as key elements of the rule of
law: "[1] a government limited by law; [2] equality under the law
for all citizens; and [3] the protection of human and civil rights."3 6
It can be difficult to secure these principles-equality under the
law, and protection of human and civil rights-for religious minorities, however, when the state has declared a national religion. A
fortiori, the incorporation of Islamic law as a foundational source of
law in the Iraqi Constitution, which cannot be contradicted in later
legislation,3 7 makes the protection of the rights of religious minorities even more difficult.
Article 2 of the Iraqi Constitution notes that "Islam is the official
religion of the State and is a foundation source of legislation."3 8
29.
30.
31.
32.

See Basic Principles,supra note 8, at
See id. at 60; discussion infra notes
See Basic Principles, supra note 8, at
See Basic Principles,supra note 8, at

33.

See discussion infra Part III.C.4.

60-62.
140-41.
60; infta text accompanying note 152.
61.

34. See Basic Principles, supra note 8, at 61; infra text accompanying note 161.
35. See generally ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA chs. 15-16 (Alfred A.
Knopf ed., 1980) (1835) (explaining the role of the judiciary to protect the minority from
the tyranny of the majority).
36. RACHEL KLEINFELD, ADVANCING THE RULE OF LAw ABROAD 13 (2012) (summarizing
A.V. DIcEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 183-95 (8th

ed. 1915)).
37. See Article 2, Section 1, Doustour Joumhouriat al-Iraq [The Constitution of the
Republic of Iraq] of 2005, translated in Iraq: Constitutionsand FundamentalLaws, supra note
5.
38. Id.
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Further, it notes that "[n] o law may be enacted that contradicts the
established provisions of Islam."39 While Iraq is not unique in its
incorporation of some form of Islamic law into its legal system, 40
the precise scope and effect of this restriction on legislation in Iraq
remains, eight years after adoption of the new Iraqi Constitution,
unclear.
It is worth noting that the Constitution does not use the term
shari'a. As with any issue of constitutional or legislative drafting,
the terminology chosen has great significance, and the Constitution speaks only of the "provisions of Islam." 4 1 While Islamic law is
broadly defined as "law that is either embodied in or derived from
Islam's foundational legal sources,"4 2 the terms shari'a and fiqh
have more specific meanings and applications. Shari'a (commonly
mischaracterized in the West as "shari'alaw") literally translates to
"path," and is divinely ordained by God and known only to Him. 4 3
Alternatively, the term fiqh, meaning discernment, is a human
attempt to understand and articulate the divine law.44 As such, it is
inherently imperfect and therefore, unlike shari'a, subject to
debate. 4 5 Moreover, there are various schools of fiqh, and a long
tradition of Islamic legal pluralism recognizes multiple, differing
fiqh that may exist related to a single law.4 6
Prior to the enactment of the Iraqi Constitution, the Transitional Administrative Law, which governed Iraq until a constitution
39. Id. The Constitution continues to declare that legislation may not contradict the
"principles of democracy" nor the rights and freedoms enumerated elsewhere in the Constitution. Id.
40. Globally, at least twenty-five countries incorporate some form of Islamic law
directly into their constitutions, while others either allow courts to apply Islamic law in
matters of personal status, or convene special courts to apply Islamic law for Muslim minority populations. See Intisar A. Rabb, "We theJurists": Islamic Constitutionalismin Iraq, 10 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 527, 527 n.1, 540 (2008) (providing a comprehensive list of countries and
the method of incorporation or application of shari'a or Islamic law into their legal
systems).
41. Article 2, Section 1, Doustour Joumhouriat al-Iraq [The Constitution of the
Republic of Iraq] of 2005, translated in Iraq: Constitutions and FundamentalLaws, supra note
5.
42. Rabb, supra note 40, at 541.
43. See id. at 542.
44. Id.
45. Cf id. (comparing Islamic law to American constitutional law and other common
law systems).
46. See ASIFA QURAISHI-LANDES, INST. FOR Soc. POL' & UNDERSTANDING, SHARIA AND
DIvERsTIYr WHY SOME AMERICANS ARE MISSING THE PoINT 14-15, (2013), availableat http://
www.ispu.org/GetReports/35/2620/Publications.aspx (last visited Oct. 26, 2013). For a
more complete history of the development of the pluralistic legal system in Islam, see
Rabb, supra note 40, at 544-47.
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could be adopted, incorporated a similar provision, stating: "Islam
is the official religion of the State and is to be considered a source
of legislation. No law that contradicts the universally agreed tenets
of Islam, the principles of democracy, or the rights cited in Chapter Two of this Law may be enacted during the transitional
period."4 7 It is unclear whether this clause in the Transitional
Administrative Law influenced the ultimate adoption of Article 2.
However, negotiations during the drafting history of the Constitution are instructive as to the challenges associated with its implementation and interpretation. 48
One early draft of Article 2 stated that "[njo law may be enacted
that contradicts [Islam's] tenets and provisions (its universally
agreed principles) ."49 The notion of "universally agreed principles" created a long-running debate over the scope of Article 2,
including questions about how widely these principles must be
agreed to before the government, or a court, can invoke them to
invalidate laws. 50 During negotiations, multiple phrasings of this
provision were proposed and discussed, including "Islam's confirmed rulings," the "universally agreed tenets of Islam," and "tenets of [Islamic] provisions."5 1 In the end, a compromise was
reached with the phrase "established provisions," which was considered to reside somewhere between the restrictive "universally
agreed," and the overly-broad "tenets."5 2
The degree to which the resulting Article 2 presents a danger to
the protection of minority rights is unclear, primarily because the
Constitution fails to define the term "established provisions."5 8 It is
certainly broader than "universally agreed tenets of Islam" as used
in the Transitional Administrative Law.5 4 The requirement of "universal agreement" implies bridging differences between Sunni and
Shi'a, and incorporating only those provisions accepted by all Mus47. Article 7, Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period of
2004 (emphasis added) (enacted under the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA)).
48. See Ashley S. Deeks & Matthey D. Burton, Iraq's Constitution:A DraftingHistory, 40
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 1, 12 (2007).

49. Id. at 13.
50. See id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 13-14.
53. See Article 2, Section 1, Doustour Joumhouriat al-Iraq [The Constitution of the
Republic of Iraq] of 2005, translated in Iraq: Constitutions and FundamentalLaws, supra note
5.
54. Article 7, Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period of
2004.
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lims as a matter of consensus. 55 Because the "universal agreement"
language was proposed but not used, the phrase "established provisions" presumably connotes a broader incorporation of Islamic law
into the Constitution, (i.e., "established provisions" sufficient to
strike down a piece of legislation need not carry universal acceptance by all Muslims).
What is unclear, however, is the extent of agreement required to
render a provision of Islamic law as "established."5 6 Some concern
arose during drafting that the term could be used to rely on fatwas,
non-binding scholarly interpretations of Islamic law, to strike down
otherwise valid legislation under Article 2.57 Additionally, there
was concern about whether the term "provisions" related only to
incorporations from Shi'a Islam.58 Taken to the logical extreme,
any single school of fiqh could be considered an established provision of Islam.59
The significance of understanding the extent to which Article 2
incorporates Islamic law into the Constitution is revealed when
considering the protection of the rights of minority religious populations. Anything short of the rigid "universally agreed" provisions
leaves open the possibility of undermining the rights of Muslim
minorities, those whose particular fiqh may be disfavored by the
government and therefore unprotected by Article 2. Even nonMuslim minorities will enjoy better protection if the scope of Article 2 is narrow, (i.e., if the range of Islamic tenets that enjoy the
force of law is small, and limited to those tenets that all Muslims
can agree upon). Anyone whose belief system lies outside the
"established provisions" recognized under Article 2 of the Constitution is therefore at risk.60
55. See Kristen A. Stilt, Islamic Law and the Making and Remaking of the Iraqi Legal System,
36 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 695, 743-44 (2004) (citing AliJuma, Al-Thabit wa-1-Mutaghayyir
fi al-Sharia al-Islamiya [ The Permanent and the Impermanent in the Islamic Sharia], 7 AL-MANAR
AL-JADID [THE NEW MINARET] 45 (1999)).
56. Rabb, supra note 40, at 548-49.
57. SeeDeeks & Burton, supra note 48, at 14. Secularists and non-Shi'a Islamic negotiators during the Constitution's drafting raised concerns that Shi'a negotiators tried to
incorporate a "wide-ranging and voluminous field of Islamic jurisprudence against which
Iraqi law would be measured" in the Constitution. Id.
58. See id.
59. See Rabb, supra note 40, at 548.
60. Consider one hypothetical as an example. Suppose that a legal exception is legislated to the prohibitions on alcoholic beverages that would allow Catholics to take wine in
their communion services. Article 2 might be interpreted, notwithstanding Article 43 (a
provision protecting free exercise of religion, see infra discussion at note 64), to strike
down this provision, because Islam does not tolerate consumption of wine for any purpose.
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In several places, however, the Iraqi Constitution specifically recognizes the rights of religious minority populations. At Article 2,
the Constitution guarantees the "full religious rights to freedom of
religious belief and practice of all individuals."6 1 Similarly, at Article 14, it notes that Iraqis are equal before the law, without discrimination based on religion. 62 Article 41 declares Iraqis free in their
"commitment to their personal status according to their religions,
sects, beliefs, or choices."6 3 Finally, Article 43 declares that the followers of all religions are free in the practice of religious rites and
the management of their religious endowments and institutions. 6 4
What is unclear is how the Federal Supreme Court will strike the
balance between these provisions. Until there is clarity as to how
the court will apply the Article 2 requirement of "established provisions" of Islam, it cannot be clear how those minority religious
populations will be protected under Articles 2, 14, 41, and 43 of
the Constitution.
The implications of religious freedom and the rights of religious
minorities for post-conflict justice should not be underestimated.
The civil war in Sudan, which finally ended with a peace agreement
in 2005 and ultimately partitioned Sudan into two separate countries, was driven almost entirely by the imposition of shari'aon the
non-Muslim population in the South.6 5 Thus, the violation of religious rights, and specifically the imposition of Islamic provisions on
a non-believing populace, can give rise to violence and conflict. 6 6
Therefore, respect for the religious freedoms of minorities
becomes an important element of postconflict justice. As Iraq and
its neighbors are already plagued by sectarian violence, prospects
for peace and reconciliation in the region may depend on it.67
See N.J. COULSON, A HISTORY OF ISLAMIC LAw 11-12 (1990). Under these circumstances,
Article 2's effect is to deny Catholics the right to free exercise of their religion.
61. Article 2, Section 2, Doustour Joumhouriat al-Iraq [The Constitution of the
Republic of Iraq] of 2005, translated in Iraq: Constitutionsand FundamentalLaws, supra note

5.
62. Id. art. 14.
63. Id. art. 41.
64. Id. art. 43.
65. Francis M. Deng, Sudan-Civil War and Genocide: DisappearingChristians of the Middle East, MIDDLE E. Q., Winter 2001, at 13 ("[T]he identity of southern Sudan has been
shaped primarily by the prolonged resistance to the imposition of Arab and Islamic culture
from the North. This has had the effect of unifying the Southerners as black Africans and
has geared them toward Christianity and the English language as means of combating
Islam and Arabism.").
66. See id.
67. See IN: Iraq Sectarian Violence Worst in Years, DW (June 1, 2013), http://www.dw
.de/un-iraq-sectarian-violence-worst-in-years/a-16853048; Tim Arango et al., As Syrians
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Article 92 and the Failure to Pass a Law on the Supreme Court
Background and History of the Federal Supreme Court

The Federal Supreme Court, as established by the Iraqi Constitution, was initially a creation of the Coalition Provisional Authority's
Transitional Administrative Law. 6 8 The law formed the Federal
Supreme Court and gave it jurisdiction to rule on (1) disputes
between the transitional government and regional governments,
(2) inconsistencies between the Transitional Administrative Law
and other laws, and (3) ordinary appeals as prescribed by law. 6 9
The only specificity in the Transitional Administrative Law with
respect to membership of the Court was that it contains "nine
members."7 0 There was no provision that the Federal Supreme
Court include scholars or experts in Islamic jurisprudence, despite
Article 7's provision that laws may not contradict "universally
agreed tenets of Islam."7 1
Early in the negotiations and drafting of the Iraqi Constitution,
Shi'a Islamists advocated for the creation of a "Constitutional
Council" separate from the regular judiciary, which would function
as a body of jurists and legal experts to ensure the constitutionality
of legislation. 7 2 The functions of this Council would have included
judging laws based on the Article 2 requirement that no enacted
law contradict the established provisions of Islam.73 This proposed
body was to be comprised of eleven members, including six judges
and five "legal experts" in religion or law generally. 74 Drafts of this
proposal would have granted the Council the ability to rule on the
constitutionality of laws prior to enactment.75 Supporters of this proFight, Sectarian Strife Infects Mideast, N.Y. TIMES (June 1, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/
2013/06/02/world/middleeast/sunni-shiite-violence-flares-in-mideast-in-wake-of-syria-war
.html.
68. See Article 44, Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional
Period of 2004. See generallyJAMES DOBBINS ET AL., OCCUPYING IRAQ: A HISTORY OF THE
COALITION PROVISIONAL AuTHORY (2009), available at http://www.rand.org/content/

dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2009/RANDMG847.pdf (explaining that the CPA is the
body created by the invading forces to govern Iraq).
69. Article 44, Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period
of 2004.
70. Id.
71. Id. art. 7.
72. Haider Ala Hamoudi, Ornamental Repugnancy:IdentitaianIslam and the Iraqi Constitution, 7 U. ST. THOMAs L.J. 692, 697-98 (2010) (citing Shi'a Islamist Proposal, Article 92
from unsigned constitutional records).
73. Id. at 698. Other versions of this proposal had differing numbers of members, all
containing only a bare majority of judges and the remainder Islamic or legal experts. Id.
74. Id. at 697-98.
75. Id. at 698.
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posal presumed that judges, given their relative unfamiliarity with
Islamic law, were unlikely to outvote Islamic experts on any point
so far from their expertise, thus giving power to the Islamic scholars to judge these laws for consistency with provisions of Islam
under Article 2.76
The Constitutional Council, however, was not to be. The compromise that the drafters ultimately struck, in Article 92, entrusted
Article 2 determinations to the Federal Supreme Court.7 7 It
included compromise language specifying that the members of the
Court should include not only judges but also "legal scholars," and
"experts in Islamic jurisprudence."7 8 The Constitution stopped
short, however, of establishing how many experts (or judges or
scholars, for that matter) must sit on the Court, or how they are
selected and appointed, leaving those determinations for later
legislation. 79
At the time of the Constitution's ratification, the Federal
Supreme Court already existed as created by the Transitional
Administrative Law in 2004 and established under an implementing "Supreme Court Law" in 2005.80 In terms of the Court's membership, the Supreme Court Law merely states that it shall consist
of one president and eight members, but in practice, since the Federal Supreme Court's adoption, all nine have been judges." The
Supreme Court Law contains no provisions for removal of judges
from the Court, although the Transitional Administrative Law says
that they can be removed if they become permanently incapacitated, or are convicted of corruption or a crime of moral
turpitude.8 2
Because it was enacted before the Constitution, the Supreme
Court Law does not create a Court as envisioned by the Constitu76. Id.
77. Id. at 699.
78. Article 92, Section 2, Doustour Joumhouriat al-Iraq [The Constitution of the
Republic of Iraq] of 2005, translated in Iraq: Constitutions and Fundamental Laws, supra note
5.
79. See id. arts. 92-94.
80. Article 44, Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period
of 2004; Article 1, Federal Supreme Court Law No. 30 of 2005 (Iraq).
81. Article 3, Federal Supreme Court Law No. 30 of 2005 (Iraq). The law does not
establish qualifications for the "members," leaving open, at least theoretically, the possibility that they be legal scholars or experts on Islamic jurisprudence. In practice, however,
the Court has been staffed exclusively with judges. See Ala Hamoudi, supra note 72, at 701;
see also Article 44, Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period of
2004 (providing for nine members).
82. Article 47, Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period
of 2004.
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tion.83 The Law does not give any direction to court membership,
nor provide any detail as to how seats on the Court shall be apportioned.8 4 Additionally, the law does not specify the qualifications
needed for nomination to the Court, and merely refers to the
Transitional Administrative Law, which gives the power to nominate candidates to the HigherJudicial Council and the authority to
appoint such candidates to the Presidency Council. 85 The jurisdiction of the Court, as defined in the law, is also somewhat at odds
with that in the Constitution.8 6
The end result of the Supreme Court Law and subsequent Constitution is that the Federal Supreme Court, as established under
the Transitional Administrative Law, continues to operate today
under the terms of its pre-Constitution enabling legislation. 7 With
no change in the membership requirements of the Court-notwithstanding Article 92's requirement that it include legal scholars
and experts on Islamic jurisprudence-it remains composed
entirely of judges, and functions, more or less, as a defacto secular
Federal Supreme Court.8 8 Some have taken this argument a step
further, saying that this makes the Federal Supreme Court itself an
implied supporter of a secular legal system, despite the Constitution's clear contrary intent.8 9
In 2007, in an effort to fully implement a Federal Supreme Court
as contemplated by Article 92 of the Constitution, a draft law was
presented that sought to redefine the organization and jurisdic83. Indeed the Supreme Court Law did not anticipate the provisions of the Constitution, and therefore does not reflect the content of the Constitution later adopted. Compare
Doustour Joumhouriat al-Iraq [The Constitution of the Republic of Iraq] of 2005, translated in Iraq: Constitutions and FundamentalLaws, supra note 5, with Federal Supreme Court
Law No. 30 of 2005 (Iraq).
84. See Federal Supreme Court Law No. 30 of 2005 (Iraq).
85. Id. art. 3.
86. CompareDoustourJoumhouriat al-Iraq [The Constitution of the Republic of Iraq]
of 2005, translated in Iraq: Constitutions and FundamentalLaws, supra note 5, with Federal
Supreme Court Law No. 30 of 2005 (Iraq). The Constitution's recitation of the Supreme
Court's jurisdiction is significantly more specific and detailed than that provided in the
Supreme Court Law.
87. See Haider Ala Hamoudi, The Iraq FederalSupreme Court Avoids InterpretingShari'aAgain, IsLAmic L. OUR TIMES (Apr. 24, 2012, 3:12 PM), http://muslimlawprof.org/2012/
04/24/the-iraq-federal-supreme-court-avoids-interpreting-sharia-again.aspx.
88. See Ala Hamoudi, supra note 72, at 701.
89. See id. In his article, Ala Hamoudi notes that sitting judges on the Federal
Supreme Court at its inception were "as unenthused as any over the prospect ofjurists who
knew not a thing about the methodologies of law sharing a bench with them." Id. Further,
the existing panel of judges repeatedly opposed proposals to include legal scholars and
Islamic experts and, at most, was only willing to have a small number sit as advisors for the
Court. Id.
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tional mandate of the court.9 0 The draft law would have maintained a judicial panel of nine judges, but sought to create an
"advisory commission" consisting of two legal experts and two
experts in Islamic jurisprudence. 9 ' While the draft law sought to
minimize the power of these non-judge members of the Court, limiting the advisory commission's participation to deliberations and
not allowing them to join in issuing judgments, it at least would
have defined a role for legal scholars and experts in Islamic jurisprudence. 92 The draft law also went a great deal further to specify
the qualifications and compensation for all members of the court
and to harmonize the statement of the Court's jurisdiction with
that in the Constitution. 93
Ultimately, the draft law was never adopted, and subsequent
attempts to craft an implementing law that more closely resembles
the requirements of the Constitution have similarly failed. 94 Complicating the picture, the Constitution requires a two-thirds majority in the Council of Representatives to pass any law establishing
the membership or defining the work of the Court.9 5 Given the
current political climate and makeup of the Council of Representatives, it is unlikely that a satisfactory compromise will soon be
reached.9 6

90. Draft Federal Supreme Court Law of 2007 (Iraq), translated in Statutes, GLOBAL
JusT. PRAc.: IRAo, http://gjpi.org/library/primary/statutes (follow "DRAFT Federal
Supreme Court Law" hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 16, 2013).
91.

Id. art. 2.
Id. art. 13.
See id. arts. 3-5, 8, 11-12.
94. Several articles and blogs have reported the attempt, and failure, to pass an implementing law. See, e.g.,JEFFREYJ. COONJOHN & ZUHAIR AL-MALIKI, CHAOS IN THE COURTS 3-4,
available at http://coonjohn.com/middle-east/chaos-in-the-courts (last visited Oct. 18,
2013); NationalAlliance Seeks to Pass Law on the FederalSupreme Court, IRAQI MEDIA NETWORK
(Jan. 22, 2013, 12:29 PM), http://www.alrafedain.net/index.php?show=news&action=arti
cle&id=94375 (Arabic text); Iraqi ParliamentPostpones Vote on Federal Court, Supreme judicial
Council Law Drafts,ALL IRAQ NEWS (Dec. 3, 2012, 11:56 AM), http://www.alliraqnews.com/
en/index.php?option=com content&view=article&id=23814; Political Leaders Forbid Endorsing Federal Court, Political Parties' Law Drafts, ALL IRAQ NEWs (June 30, 2012, 11:15 AM),
available at http://www.alliraqnews.com/en/index.php?option=comcontent&view=article
&id=13320.
95. Article 92, Section 2, Doustour Joumhouriat al-Iraq [The Constitution of the
Republic of Iraq] of 2005, translated in Iraq: Constitutions and FundamentalLaws, supra note
5.
92.
93.

96.

See Iraq: Council of Representatives of Iraq, INTER-PARLIAMENTARY UNION,

http://

www.ipu.org/parline/reports/2151.htm (last visited Oct. 8, 2013) (providing a breakdown
of political party power in the Council of Representatives).
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The Federal Supreme Court-A Functioning Legal
Institution?

Article 92 of the Constitution remains unimplemented, which
has serious implications for the rule of law in Iraq. The structure
and makeup of the Federal Supreme Court articulated in the Constitution, however loosely, has yet to be put in place.9 7 This raises
the question of whether the Court has the competence to exercise
its judicial authority to judge laws pursuant to Article 2 of the Constitution. In practice, the Federal Supreme Court represents one
of the most meaningful rule of law institutions in Iraq, and it is not
operating consistently with its constitutional mandate. While the
overall threat to the rule of law this poses may be limited because
the Court is nonetheless functioning, it still raises questions as to
the Court's legitimacy.
One of the core problems this presents is the failure of the Court
to carry out its constitutional duties. Article 93 of the Constitution
enumerates the jurisdictional powers of the Federal Supreme
Court.9 8 The first jurisdictional power of the Court is to oversee
the constitutionality of laws and regulations in effect, including
laws challenged under Article 2.99 Despite this charge to rule on
whether laws conform with "established provisions of Islam,"1 00 the
Federal Supreme Court is not doing so. By 2010, the Court had
only rendered one such ruling dealing with established provisions
of Islam under Article 2.101 Since that time, the Court has been
successful in avoiding issues related to Islamic jurisprudence,
mostly by deferring to the legislature as better qualified to interpret Islamic law, or through procedural mechanisms to dismiss
cases altogether.10 2 One commentator noted that as long as the
Federal Supreme Court is unwilling to exercise it, the power to
void laws that contradict Islam under Article 2 is "from a legal
standpoint ... largely an empty one devoid of legal content."10 3
97. See Ala Hamoudi, supra note 72, at 700-02.
98. Article 93, Doustour Joumhouriat al-Iraq [The Constitution of the Republic of
Iraq] of 2005, translated in Iraq: Constitutions and FundamentalLaws, supra note 5.
99. See id.
100. Id. art. 2.
101. See Ala Hamoudi, supra note 72, at 692.
102. See Haider Ala Hamoudi, Judicial Review of Islamic Law Under Iraq's Constitution,
JURIST (Apr. 26, 2012), http://jurist.org/forum/2012/04/haider-hamoudi-iraq-islam
.php; see also Ala Hamoudi, supra note 87 (describing how the Supreme Court used procedural issues to avoid deciding three recent cases on Shari'a law).
103. Ala Hamoudi, supra note 72, at 711.
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Under the current system, the Federal Supreme Court is acting
without a proper implementing law as required by Article 92 of the
Constitution. 10 4 Moreover, the Court, by declining to exercise its
Article 2 power, has in essence rendered that jurisdiction meaningless. 0 5 As long as the spirit and terms of the Constitution, particularly those governing the Federal Supreme Court, are not being
implemented, the result is a serious breakdown of the rule of law.
Specifically, it is a violation of the core rule of law principle that
government institutions are subject to duly enacted law and must
act consistently with it. That the Court is functioning at all is laudable, in terms of minimizing the impact of the rule of law breakdown, but makeshift operations cannot afford legitimacy to a
system where the terms of the Constitution remain
unimplemented. 0 6
3.

The Federal Supreme Court-Eroding Public Confidence in
the Judiciary

A second and significant effect of the failure to properly implement a law on the Federal Supreme Court is the erosion of public
confidence in rule of law institutions. The Constitution states in
four different places that judges, the judiciary, or the judicial
power are independent.10 7 Mere inspirational overtures, however,
do not create judicial independence, nor do they establish public
confidence-especially when other parts of the Constitution
remain unenforced. 0 8 Therefore, to establish public confidence,
it is not enough to create a functional court system worthy of trust,
but it must establish and earn that confidence itself. 09 The failure
to pass a proper implementing law and the avoidance of Article 2
issues create a real challenge for fostering a sense of confidence in
the judiciary.
While the Constitution provides that the Federal Supreme Court
shall include not only judges, but also legal scholars and experts on
104. See supra note 94.

105. See Ala Hamoudi, supra note 72, at 702.
106. The ad hoc operation of the Federal Supreme Court, unauthorized by and inconsistent with the terms of the Constitution, helps the rule of law by providing some decisionmaking functions to fill the power vacuum. See Ala Hamoudi, supra note 72, at 692, 696.
But it does so only by undermining the rule of law principle that courts should be functioning under according to the terms of the duly adopted Constitution. See id.
107. See Articles 19, 87-88, 92, Doustour Joumhouriat al-Iraq [The Constitution of the
Republic of Iraq] of 2005, translated in Iraq: Constitutionsand FundamentalLaws, supra note

5.
108.
109.

See text accompanying notes 98-103.
See text accompanying notes 13-18.
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Islamic jurisprudence, considerable doubt remains as to the role
that the nonjudge members would play in Court operations.110
The legislation proposed in 2007 would have made them mere
advisors,"' but in 2012, Mohamed Fadhil, the legal advisor to the
Prime Minister, argued that the Constitution is "very clear" that
experts in the Islamic Religion are to be original members rather
than advisors within the Court.11 2 Regardless of the Constitution's
intent on this point, no one can argue that the Court presently
complies with the Constitutional requirements for its composition.
Nonetheless, Fadhil's powerful public statement condemning the
status quo can do little to inspire public confidence in the Court or
to strengthen the perception that it is functioning as the Constitution intended.
On the positive side, one commentator notes that in recent years
the judiciary has been "robust and increasingly outspoken, willing
to address core legal questions that constrain executive power."113
One such example is the Federal Supreme Court's certification of
electoral results that favored the rival of the sitting Prime Minister.11 4 On the other hand, there are several instances of the Federal Supreme Court issuing decisions that may erode the public's
trust. For instance, one commentator characterized as political
maneuvering the Chief Justice's tendency to support executive
authority over perceived legitimate legislative action. 115
While the Court technically functions and may on occasion be
"robust" and "outspoken," it does so operating under an existing
law that is contrary to the relevant provisions in the Constitution.' 6
Some of the Court's activity, and certainly that of its Chief Justice,
has raised serious questions about the Court's independence.11 7
Together, this creates a real danger of public perception that the
Federal Supreme Court-and as a result the judiciary as a whole110. See Article 92, DoustourJoumhouriat al-Iraq [The Constitution of the Republic of
Iraq] of 2005, translated in Iraq: Constitutions and FundamentalLaws, supra note 5.
111. See supra notes 91-93 and accompanying text.
112. Religious Experts Members Not Advisors Within Federal Court, Assures Maliki's Advisor,
ALL IRAQ NEWS (Aug. 14, 2012, 1:59 PM), http://www.alliraqnews.com/en/index.php?op
tion=comcontent&view=article&id=16429.
113. Haider Ala Hamoudi, InternationalLaw and Iraqi Courts, in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN
DOMESTIC COURTs: RULE OF LAW REFORM IN PosT-CONFLicr STATEs 107, 108 (Edda KristAn-

sd6ttir et al. eds., 2012).
114. Id. at 108-09.
115. See COONJOHN & AL-MALIUI, supra note 94, at 1-2.
116. See Ala Hamoudi, supra note 113, at 108.
117. Id. at 110.
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is not a legitimate, functional institution, worthy of the public's
confidence and trust.
C.

Other Issues Related to judicial Independence

1. De-Ba'athification as a Threat to Judicial Independence
The process of lustration in postconflict Iraq, known as deBa'athification, involves legal and administrative measures to prevent the Ba'ath party from regaining political power after the fall
of Saddam Hussein's regime.11 8 Introduced in April 2003, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) was initially charged with implementing the process.1 1 9 At that time, de-Ba'athification excluded
top-ranking individuals from public administration positions based
upon prior membership in the Ba'ath party.120 When control
shifted to the Iraqi Governing Council in August 2003, deBa'athification fell under the control of the newly established
Higher National De-Ba'athification Commission (Commission). 121
The Commission quickly expanded the scope of de-Ba'athification
by broadening the categories of covered persons under the law. 122
The CPA was critical of the Commission, which operated without
the due process protections that the CPA attempted to include
when it created the process.12 3 In 2008, after a controversial vote,
the new al-Maliki government reformed the de-Ba'athification process by creating the Higher National Commission for Accountability and Justice (HNCAJ) to take over the program.124 The HNCAJ
included significant changes on paper, but continued to operate in
much the same way.' 2 5
For example, in 2008 the HNCAJ called for all former Ba'ath
party members still in government to re-apply under the new
law.' 2 6 The HNCAJ became embroiled in controversy in 2010
when it invalidated over five hundred nominees for the upcoming
118. MIRANDA SIssoNs & ABDULRAZZAQ AL-SAIEDI, INT'L CTR. FOR TRANSITIONAL JUST., A
BrTER LEGACy- LESSONS OF DE-BAATHIFICATION IN IRAQ 9 (2013), available at http://

ictj.org/publication/bitter-legacy-lessons-de-baathification-iraq.
119. See id. at 10-11.
120. Id. at 11.
121. Id. at 12.
122. Id.
123. See id. at 13.
124.

SISSONS & AL-SAIEDI, supra note 118, at 17-19 (citing the Supreme National Com-

mission of Accountability and Justice Law of 2008 (Iraq)).
125. See SissoNs & AL-SAIEDI, supra note 118, at 18-19.
126. Id. at 19. This resulted in some forty-one thousand applications to the Commission. Id.
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parliamentary elections. 12 7 Based upon these and other actions,
some scholars have criticized de-Ba'athification as improperly
emphasizing an individual's status rather than an individual's conduct. 128 In many cases, the HNCAJ did not assess specific criteria,
such as one's human rights record or one's integrity; rather, the
HNCAJ barred individuals from public employment solely for prior
Ba'ath party membership.129 Critics have also noted the inadequacy of oversight to review the actions of the Commission and the
HNCAJ, allowing the potential for unfettered discretion in implementing de-Ba'athification.o3 0 Complications in implementing lustration-such as wide discretion to remove officials from office
with little cause and with scant attention to the individual's procedural due process rights-can have significant implications for
judicial independence.
These issues manifested themselves during the Dujail trial
against Saddam Hussein.'13 The Iraqi High Tribunal (IHT) convened the Dujail trial to investigate and try Saddam Hussein and
others related to charges of crimes against humanity committed in
the town of al-Dujail.132 Although the IHT had its own rules for
dismissing judges based upon de-Ba'athification concerns, the
Commission intervened on three separate occasions to remove
administrative staff and judges involved in the case.' 33 Reasons for
this interference ranged from criticism over one judge's liberal
leanings, to ousting judges that the Commission suspected of reluctance in applying capital punishment.134 The Commission also
made similar allegations of interference in the subsequent Anfal
trial before the IHT, where the Commission supposedly imple127.

See id. at 19-20; Charles P. Trumbull IV &Julie B. Martin, Elections and Government

Formationin Iraq: An Analysis of theJudiciary's Role, 44 VAND.

J.

TRANSNAT'L L. 331, 355-60

(2011).
128. See Eric Stover et al., justice on Hold Accountability and Social Reconstruction in Iraq,
INT'L REv. RED CRoss, Mar. 2008, at 5, 20; SISSONS & AL-SAIEDI, supra note 118, at 31-37.

129.

Stover et al., supra note 128, at 22.
See SissoNs & AL-SAIEDI, supra note 118, at 34-35.
131. See Stover et al., supra note 128, at 13-15.
132. See SIssoNs & AL-SAIEDI, supra note 118, at 16-17; Stover et al., supra note 128, at
15-16; Symposium, Transcript:Analysis of the Dujail Tria4 39 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 209,
130.

210-11 (2006-2007); A Poisoned Chalice: The Substantive andProceduralDefects of the Iraqi High
Tribunal 39 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 261, 295-99 (2006-2007). The Iraqi High Tribunal

(IHT) was a judicial body created by the Iraqi Interim Governing Council and later
approved by the Iraqi National Assembly. Michael P. Scharf & Michael A. Newton, The
Iraqi High Tribunal's Dujail Trial Opinion, ASIL INSIGHTS (Dec. 18, 2006), http://www.asil

.org/insights/volume/10/issue/34/iraqi-high-tribunals-dujail-trial-opinion.
133. See SISSoNs & AL-SAIEDI, supra note 118, at 16.
134. See Stover et al., supra note 128, at 14-15.
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mented de-Ba'athification purges that affected the composition
and fairness of the Tribunal.13 5
The potential threat to judicial independence persists even
today. In February 2013, the HNCAJ deemed the long-time Chief
Justice of the Federal Supreme Court, Medhat al-Mahmoud, ineligible for public office and removed him because of positions he
held during the Saddam Hussein regime.136 The allegations characterized Medhat as a "Saddamist" who taught judges "to commit
offenses against the Iraqi people."13 7 It has been suggested, however, that the real motivation for seeking Medhat's removal came
from his controversial decision to strike down term-limits legislation, a ruling that purportedly insulates the Prime Minister from
serious political challenge in years to come. 38 While Medhat was
later re-instated after appeal to the Court of Cassation,1s 9 his
removal undoubtedly sent a message to judges throughout the system that any one of them could be targeted for removal in this way.
The interference of the de-Ba'athification Commission with the
judicial process of the IHT raises serious issues with the rule of law
and judicial independence in Iraq. In other words, it appears that
the Commission used de-Ba'athification proceedings to influence
members of the judiciary in the outcome of these cases, and past
patterns of abuse can easily intimidate sitting judges, undermining
judicial independence in future cases.
2.

No Improper Influences or Interference with the Judicial
Process

Paragraph 2 of the U.N. Basic Principles on the Independence
of the Judiciary states that the judiciary shall decide matters before
them "without any restrictions, improper influences, inducements,
pressures, threats or interferences, direct or indirect, from any
quarter or for any reason."140 Paragraph 4 condemns any "inappropriate or unwarranted interference with the judicial process."141
135. See Transcript:Analysis of the Dujail Trial, supra note 132, at 211; Jennifer Trahan,
Remarks Regarding the Iraqi High Tribunal's "Anfal" Trial: Speech Delivered at InternationalLaw
Weekend, 15 ILSAJ. Iwr'L & COMP. L. 587, 598 (2009).
136. See Haider Ala Hamoudi, Medhat al-Mahmoud and De-Ba'athification in Baghdad,
JURIST (Mar. 15, 2013), http://jurist.org/forum/2013/03/haider-hamoudi-debaathifica
tion.php.

137.
138.
139.
140.

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
See COONJOHN & AL-MALU, supra note 94, at 1-4.
See id. at 5.
Basic Principles, supra note 8, at 60.

141.

Id.
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Religious Influence and Interference

One concern for Iraq is that the Constitution accords juridical
significance to established provisions of Islam, which opens the
door to influence from religious leaders or authorities. 142 How the
courts address these issues, and whom they must rely on for determinations on questions of what Islamic principles require, may well
open them to outside influences, seriously compromising their
independence. For example, if Article 2 were interpreted to
require judicial fealty to fatwas,143 then anyone authorized to issue
a fatwa would have direct power to dictate outcomes in judicial
cases.
b.

Political Influence and Interference

In addition to the potential for religious influence, there are
noted instances of political (executive) influence on the judiciary.144 One controversial case arose shortly before the 2010 parliamentary elections in Iraq, when the Supreme Commission for
Accountability and Justice announced that, pursuant to relevant
de-Ba'athification laws, it had disqualified over five hundred nominees from participating in the election.145 The Court of Cassation
overturned the Commission's ruling, holding that there was not
sufficient time before the election to complete a proper review of
the claims against the nominees, and that they should be allowed
to participate in the election subject to postelection review.146
The Court of Cassation's decision, however, was largely unpopular with the Prime Minister and his political allies.' 47 Under great
pressure, and after meetings with the Prime Minister and other
political leaders, the Court of Cassation reversed its decision and
ultimately allowed only twenty-six candidates to stand for elec142. See Article 2, Doustour Joumhouriat al-Iraq [The Constitution of the Republic of
Iraq] of 2005, translatedin Iraq: Constitutions and FundamentalLaws, supra note 5; discussion
of Article 2 supra Part III.B.3.
143. Cf supra note 57 and accompanying text (indicating that secularists feared the
possibility of treating fatwas as a type of judicial ruling).
144. See, e.g., COONJOHN & AL-MALIKI, supra note 94, at 1-2. One 2006 report noted
that judges "face intense pressure from external forces and individuals." ABA IRAQ LEGAL
DEv. PROJECTJUDICIAL REFORM INDEX FOR IRAQ 2 (2006), available at http://apps.american
bar.org/rol/publications/jri-iraq-2006.pdf (emphasis omitted).
145. See supra note 127.
146. Trumbull & Martin, supra note 127, at 358 (citing Tamiez [Cassation, special
chamber], decision No. 108 of February 3, 2010 (Iraq), translatedinJudicialPanel Overturns
Election Ban, GLOBALJUSTICE PRACTICE: IRAQ (Feb. 3, 2010), http://www.gjpi.org/2010/02/

03/appeal-panel-overturns-election-ban-and-postpones-de-baathification-examination).
147. See Trumbull & Martin, supra note 127, at 360 n.217.
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tion.148 Iraqis generally perceived this reversal as evidence that the

judiciary was susceptible to political pressure, and thus lacked
independence .149
Another example came in 2011, when the Federal Supreme
Court rendered a decision, authored by the Chief Justice, ruling
that a series of previously powerful and independent agencies were
subject to direct cabinet oversight.1 5 0 One commentator referred
to this case as the Prime Minister utilizing his "increasingly pliable
judiciary" to weaken oversights and empower the executive.1 5 1
Cases like these raise serious doubts about the judiciary's ability
to withstand pressure and interference from a very powerful executive. At the very least, the situation seriously undermines public
confidence in the judiciary and, more particularly, in its
independence.
3.

Right to be Tried Using Established Legal Procedures

Paragraph 5 of the U.N. Basic Principles is designed to avoid the
creation of a special court to hear a specific case and thereby circumvent the regular court system. It states: "Everyone shall have
the right to be tried by ordinary courts or tribunals using established legal procedures. Tribunals that do not use the duly established procedures of the legal process shall not be created to
displace the jurisdiction belonging to the ordinary courts or judicial tribunals."15 2
In Iraq, the problem is not necessarily the creation of special
courts that do not follow the "established legal procedures," but
that such procedures-at least for the Federal Supreme Courthave never been established in the first place. The Constitution
states that "[t] he law shall regulate the establishment of courts,"15 3
and that "the work of the [Supreme] Court shall be determined by
148. Id. at 359-61; Ala Hamoudi, supra note 113, at 110.
149. See Trumbull & Martin, supra note 127, at 360 (citing Adeed Dawisha, Iraq: A Vote
Against Sectarianism,J. DEMOCRACY, July 2010, at 26, 39; Ranj Alaaldin, Iraq's Troubled Elections, GUARDLAN (Feb. 15, 2010, 5:30 AM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/
2010/feb/15/iraq-elections-baath-ban).
150. See Toby Dodge, State and Society in Iraq Ten Years After Regime Change: The Rise ofa
New Authoritarianism,89 Iwr'L AFFAIRs 241, 248 (2011) (referring to the Court's ruling that
the Committee of Integrity, the Independent High Electoral Commission, the Central
Bank of Iraq, and the High Commission for Human Rights-all independent institutions
created by the CPA-were under the direct oversight of the cabinet).
151. Id. at 248.
152. Basic Pinciples, supra note 8, at 60.
153. Article 96, Doustour Joumhouriat al-Iraq [The Constitution of the Republic of
Iraq] of 2005, translated in Iraq: Constitutions and FundamentalLaws, supra note 5.
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a law enacted by a two-thirds majority."1 54 Yet, the Council of Representatives has been unable to pass such a law (on the Supreme
Court) in the eight years since the Constitution was adopted.1 55
So, the Federal Supreme Court is arguably without "duly established procedures" in violation of Paragraph 5 of the U.N. Basic
Principles.
4. Judges with Appropriate Training or Qualifications
Paragraph 10 of the U.N. Basic Principles sets standards for qualification and selection of judges, and requires that those selected
have "appropriate training or qualifications in law."156 There are
some concerns regarding this principle under Iraq's present Federal Supreme Court. The Constitution is silent as to the requirements of any of its members, whether they are judges, legal
scholars, or experts in Islamic jurisprudence.1 5 7 While there is no
indication that the Court's current members lack the qualifications
needed to be effective judges, the qualifications of successor members may be questioned if these are not clearly defined as the Constitution requires. 15 8
Especially problematic is that Article 92 entrusts the Federal
Supreme Court with the enforcement of Article 2's prohibition on
laws that conflict with "established provisions of Islam," yet there is
no evidence that its current members have training or qualifications on principles of Islam.1 59 The Constitution attempts to
address this by providing for "experts in Islamic jurisprudence" to
be members of the Court, 16 0 but until an implementing law is
adopted to put this into effect, the members of the Federal
Supreme Court may lack the training and qualification necessary
to decide these issues that come before them.

154.

Id. art. 92.

COONJOHN & AL-MALIKI, supra note 94, at 3.
156. Basic Principles, supra note 8, at 61.
157. See Articles 92, 96, DoustourJoumbouriat al-Iraq [The Constitution of the Republic of Iraq] of 2005, translatedin Iraq: Constitutions and FundamentalLaws, supra note 5.
158. Cf id. art. 92 (requiring the Council of Representatives to pass legislation defining
the number and method of selection of judges and the work of the judiciary).
159. Cf Ala Hamoudi, supra note 72, at 701 (noting that the Federal Supreme Court as
it existed at ratification was staffed entirely by judges).
160. Article 92, Doustour Joumhouriat al-Iraq [The Constitution of the Republic of
Iraq] of 2005, translated in Iraq: Constitutions and Fundamental Laws, supra note 5.
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Conditions of Service and Tenure, Including Security

Paragraphs 11 and 12 of the U.N. Basic Principles require that
judges' security, salaries, terms of office, and tenure be secured by
law.'61 The lack of a law on courts means that these very provisions
are not protected or even identified by law. Again, the continued
reliance on the Transitional Administrative Law, and not the more
recent Iraqi Constitution, is destructive of general rule of law
principles.
Particularly noteworthy is a judge's personal security, which is
specifically mentioned in the U.N. Basic Principles as an element
ofjudicial independence, 6 2 and which remains a serious challenge
in postconflict Iraq.163 Early on in the occupation of Iraq, judicial
security was so weak that the CPA issued an order to provide pensions to the families of judges assassinated after the start of the
occupation.164 One report in August 2010 indicated that judicial
security improved somewhat due to increased levels of personal
security and equipping judges with weapons and ballistic vests.165
But judicial intimidation nonetheless persisted and remains a serious issue.' 66 As recently as 2011, there were still high numbers of
targeted attacks against government officials, approximately ten
per month, two-thirds of which resulted in death.167 In mid-2012, a
criminal court judge was gunned down as he was returning home
from work.e 8 As long as a significant risk to the health and safety
161. Basic Principles,supra note 8, at 61.
162. See id.
163. See, e.g., Duraid Adnan, Attacks in Iraqi Cities Raise Fears ofRenewed Sectarian Conflict,
N.Y. TIMES (May 20, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/21/world/middleeast/
baghdad-basra-iraq-bombings.html ("[Recent] attacks sharpened concerns that sectarian
violence was pushing the country toward a conflagration similar to the widespread fighting
of 2006 and 2007, before the withdrawal of American forces."); France Concerned About Deteriorating Security in Iraq, KUWAIT NEWS AGENCY (May 21, 2013, 5:35 PM), http://
www.kuna.net.kw/ArticleDetails.aspx?id=2312204&language=en ("It is the worst security
climate in Iraq for years.").
164. See Lewis, supra note 3, at 132-33 (citing Coalition Provisional Authority Order
No. 52: Payment of Pensions for Judges and Prosecutors who Die While Holding Office
(Jan. 8, 2004)). One report from 2006 claimed that "the most serious issue facing Iraqi
judges ... is survival." ABA IRAQ LEGAL DEV. PROJECT, supra note 144, at 2.
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168. Bombs Kill 4,Judge Shot as IraqAttacks Grind On, USA TODAY (July 1, 2012, 8:04 PM),
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/story/2012-07-01/iraq-qaeda-attacks/
55963002/1. The article described this incident as follows:
In the northern city of Mosul, gunmen killed criminal court judge Abdul-Latif
Mohammed in a drive-by shooting as he was returning home from work, police
said.... Government officials and security forces are among the chief targets of
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of judges and their families remains, they will be more susceptible
to exploitation-causing coercion and corruption, and threatening the independence of the judiciary.
Judicial compensation is one issue that is addressed by the 2005
Federal Supreme Court Law.16 9 It notes that the members of the
Court are awarded the same compensation and benefits as government ministers.170 Additionally, members are entitled to a pension
equal to eighty percent of their monthly salary as long as they are
not removed for conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude or
resign without permission of the Presidency Council. 171 The failed
2007 Draft Law would have added a detailed pay scale based on
rank and would have provided paid leave by law.172
Term of office and tenure for members of the Federal Supreme
Court are issues that present a challenge to the Court's judicial
independence. The 2005 law does not specify a term of years for
members of the Court, and indicates that the Court may "continue
to exercise their functions without determining a maximum age
limit." 7 3 With respect to tenure, the Constitution again calls for
an implementing law, stating that "[j]udges may not be removed
except in cases specified by law."1 7 4 The 2005 law-the only one in
place-states that members of the Court may be removed, however, based on "disqualification due to conviction for a crime
involving moral turpitude or corruption,"'b7 5 ut it is silent on any
procedural provisions for such a removal from office. 176 This failure to properly adopt a law that defines the term of office and
tenure, and to specify appropriate due process requirements for a
judge facing removal,17 7 could be problematic for judicial
independence.
al-Qaeda-affiliated insurgents, who experts say have been emboldened by political
feuding that has paralyzed the government and are hoping to reignite fighting
among the country's ethnic and sectarian factions.
Id.
169. Article 6, Federal Supreme Court Law No. 30 of 2005 (Iraq).
170. See id.
171. Id.
172. Articles 11-12, Draft Federal Supreme Court Law of 2007 (Iraq).
173. Article 6, Federal Supreme Court Law No. 30 of 2005 (Iraq) (author's
translation).
174. Article 97, Doustour Joumhouriat al-Iraq [The Constitution of the Republic of
Iraq] of 2005, translated in Iraq: Constitutions and FundamentalLaws, supra note 5.
175. Article 6, Federal Supreme Court Law No. 30 of 2005 (Iraq) (author's
translation).
176. See id.
177. It is easy to imagine, for example, that a judge might be arrested for trespass
incident to a dispute over ownership of land. Whether conviction for such a crime war-
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Overall, there remains considerable uncertainty about judges'
terms and conditions of service, as the system is still relying on laws
that predate the Constitution. 17 Until the law defines and secures
these conditions, and provides adequate personal security to
ensure the safety of judges and their families, judicial independence in Iraq will remain elusive.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The challenges for the Iraqi judiciary are manifold, and the
promise of judicial independence and of, more generally, the rule
of law, is tenuous. Article 2 poses inherent challenges, as it blurs
the delineation between church and state, casting doubt on the
Federal Supreme Court's ability to protect religious minorities or
to function independently of religious influence and pressure.
The failure to pass implementing legislation for the Court, as
called for in Article 92, further imperils the Court's legitimacy and
efficacy. Indeed, the Court is established and operating under statutes that pre-date, and that are inconsistent with, the present-day
Iraqi Constitution. The absence of a law governing the Court
raises a series of other concerns about specific aspects of judicial
independence, including judicial qualifications, conditions of service, and security. Moreover, the actual political influence of the
executive branch and of the de-Ba'athification authorities on Iraqi
judges gives them little hope of achieving the degree of independence required to establish the rule of law in a deeply troubled and
conflict-ridden society.
Hopes for the rule of law in postconflict Iraq depend heavily on
Iraq's ability to address these deficiencies in judicial independence. Failure to remedy these shortcomings may doom Iraqi society to further injustice, conflict, and even violence in the years to
come. Effective legal institutions, however, could make all the difference in the world, setting the stage for effective anti-corruption,
reconciliation, peace-building, and justice among a people who
desperately need it and who have lived without it for far too long.

rants removal from office will depend on whether this is a crime of "moral turpitude." See
id. Ajudge should be entitled to a hearing on that or other potential issues.
178. See supra text accompanying note 80.

